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Near the end of the Cold War, the historian John Lewis 
Gaddis coined the phrase “the Long Peace” to name the surprising 
fact that there had been no wars among the great powers in forty 
years.1 The Long Peace has now lasted more than seventy years, and 
during much of that time armed conflict and war deaths declined. 
                                               
* University Professor and Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown 
University, Washington, D.C., USA; Distinguished Chair in Ethics, Stockdale 
Center for Ethical Leadership, United States Naval Academy. 
This essay originated as a keynote address at the 2017 IVR congress in 
Lisbon, and again at the “Beyond the State” conference at McMaster University 
and the “Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: Stocktaking” conference at the 
Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Cambridge University. I also presented 
it at the colloquium of the Center for Transnational Legal Studies in London, at 
CTLS’s Toronto conference, and at the U.S. Navel Academy’s Stockdale Center. 
In this published version, I have tried to maintain some of the personal style of 
the spoken address.  
Thanks are due to all who participated in these events and offered 
comments and critiques, and especially to Doyle Hodges, Sarah Nouwen, Arthur 
Ripstein, and Antje Wiener for detailed comments. Thanks as well to Evan 
Criddle, Evan Fox-Decent, Katja Hering, and David Wolitz. My debt to Eyal 
Benvenisti will be apparent in the essay; he introduced me to his theory of 
sovereigns as trustees of humanity in 2011. 
Many of these ideas originated in the year-long research seminar on the 
future of armed conflict conducted at the Stockdale Center in 2016-17. I owe 
thanks to the participants: Charlotte Asdahl, Ed Barrett, Andrew Bell, Adam Betz, 
Chris Eberle, Marcus Hedahl, David Lefkowitz, Mitt Regan, Michael Skerker, 
and Cameron Wegener.  
An earlier draft, under the title “Nationalism, Human Rights, and the 
Prospects for Peace: An Essay on Sovereign Responsibilities,” appeared as Global 
Trust Working Paper WPS 2018-02, http://globaltrust.tau.ac.il/wps-2018-02-
nationalism-human-rights-and-the-prospects-for-peace-an-essay-on-sovereign-
responsibilities/. 
1 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War 
(Oxford University Press, 1987). 
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Unhappily, since 2010 that trend has reversed, and violent conflicts 
have steadily become more frequent and more lethal.2 The essay that 
follows is born of anxiety about novel threats to peace – social and 
political threats as well as military and technological. It worries that 
our familiar conceptions of state sovereignty cannot sustain a legal 
order capable of meeting those threats, not even if we understand 
sovereignty as responsibility to protect human rights. I tentatively 
propose that recent efforts to reformulate state sovereignty as 
responsibility to humanity offer a better hope. Under this 
reformulation, states must take into account the interests of those 
outside their sovereign territory as well as those of their own people 
– in particular, the shared interest in subduing dire threats to world 
peace. 
Responsibility to humanity – I call it ‘R2H’ for short – raises 
difficult practical and philosophical questions, which I shall try to 
answer. Some readers may fear that R2H is a Trojan horse that 
would allow powerful interests to impose their will on those less 
powerful. I shall argue that these fears arise from a 
misunderstanding of what R2H requires. To others, such a utopian-
sounding proposal may seem like exactly the wrong medicine, at a 
time of waning trust in internationalism and an upsurge of 
reactionary nationalism. In response, I argue that reactionary 
nationalism is itself a dire moral and practical mistake – a symptom 
of our current problems, not a cure. 
My approach in this essay is historical, philosophical, and 
unapologetically speculative; but the threats I describe are all too 
real. I begin with a brief review of familiar history: the creation of 
the postwar international order, centered on peace and human rights, 
and the old and new concepts of sovereignty entangled with it 
(sections 1 through 3). Next I survey the landscape of contemporary 
threats to peace (sections 4 and 5). In sections 6 through 9 I 
introduce R2H and explore some practical and philosophical 
questions it raises. Finally, in section 10 I examine the dangers of 
reactionary nationalism. 
                                               
2 For the most recent data, see United Nations; World Bank, Pathways for Peace: 
Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict (Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 2018), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337, 11-19. 
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1. The UN order and the rights-peace hypothesis 
 The loveliest and most peaceful spot in my home city of 
Washington is an old mansion called Dumbarton Oaks. In 1940 its 
owners donated it to Harvard University, and today it is one of 
Washington’s beloved (if lesser known) tourist attractions. It houses 
a jewel-like museum of Byzantine and Pre-Columbian art and a 
large Mediterranean-style garden of surpassing beauty. Igor 
Stravinsky composed his Chamber Concerto in E Flat while he was 
a guest at Dumbarton Oaks. 
In autumn of 1944, days from the end of World War II, 
Dumbarton Oaks hosted another kind of creation, aiming at another 
kind of peacefulness: there the first postwar conference to create the 
United Nations took place. Less than a year later, the UN Charter 
was adopted in San Francisco. 
Chillingly, the Dumbarton Oaks meetings convened exactly 
two weeks after the United States dropped an atomic bomb on 
Hiroshima. Perhaps it was hypocrisy for peacemakers to meet in the 
capital of a country that had unapologetically dropped the bomb. But 
we know that hypocrisy is the homage that vice pays to virtue.  
In the words of the UN Charter, the UN’s aim is “to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our 
lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.” “Untold sorrow” 
was plain truth, not rhetoric. The Second World War killed 60 
million people, three percent of the world’s population; this, less 
than thirty years after World War I killed 15 million. Untold sorrow 
was written on landscapes and cenotaphs in five continents. 
The Preamble goes on to “reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” The 
emphasis on human rights and human dignity was also exactly right: 
close to 12 million of the war deaths were intentional murders of 
helpless civilians and prisoners of war. And yet the significance of 
human rights was not immediately obvious, and giving human rights 
a central role came late in the Charter’s drafting process. The 
Dumbarton draft barely mentioned human rights. At San Francisco, 
the South African diplomat Jan Smuts introduced human rights into 
the Preamble, and connected it with the “sanctity” of human life. 
Virginia Gildersleeve, of the U.S. delegation, changed “sanctity” to 
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“dignity.”3 The Preamble draws no explicit connection between the 
peace and human rights pillars of the Charter.  
 Connection of a sort came four years later, when the UN’s 
General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. The UDHR’s Preamble begins as follows: 
[R]ecognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world. 
Why is respect for human dignity and human rights the foundation 
of peace? Presumably, the argument is that without such respect, 
nothing will constrain our aggressive drives except brute force and 
fear, undermining the Charter’s prohibition on the threat or use of 
force.4 The Declaration goes on to argue that without protection of 
their human rights, oppressed people will be “compelled to have 
recourse to rebellion.” Rebellions are seldom a purely internal 
matter, and they jeopardize international peace in several ways. 
Tyrannies often try to forestall rebellions with distracting military 
adventures; then, when rebellions break out, neighboring states may 
become embroiled, sometimes to protect their own nationals in the 
conflict zone, sometimes to protect their borders from spill-over 
violence and waves of refugees. These are arguments that domestic 
respect for human rights is a necessary condition for peace, both 
domestically and internationally.  
The UN’s founders apparently didn’t think that domestic 
respect for human rights is a sufficient condition for peace: their 
principal peace-keeping devices consist of the prohibition on the 
threat or use of force by states against other states, backed by 
Security Council powers to act against threats to peace.5 But the 
                                               
3 Sam Moyn, “Why Is Dignity in the Charter of the United Nations?”, Humanity 
Journal, June 10, 2014, http://humanityjournal.org/blog/why-is-dignity-in-the-
charter-of-the-united-nations-2/.  
4 UN Charter, art. 2(4). 
5 It is worth remembering that in its original conception, the United Nations would 
have its own military forces, contributed by member states, under the supervision 
of a Military Staff Committee. UN Charter, art. 43-47. However, “Cold War 
dynamics and the early rejection of an autonomous, permanent UN military force 
prevented the MSC from fulfilling its intended purpose of serving as the UN’s 
global defence department.” Webpage of the UN Military Staff Committee, 
https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/subsidiary/msc. 
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prominent place of human rights in the Charter perhaps suggests that 
the framers saw domestic rights fulfillment as a contributor to peace, 
if only by damping down the discontents that motivate rebellion and 
war. Call the proposition that fulfilling human rights will contribute 
to peace the rights-peace hypothesis. Over the intervening decades, 
researchers have found at least some confirming evidence that states 
that do the best job of protecting human rights domestically are also 
less belligerent in foreign affairs.6 
This is emphatically not to suggest that human rights have 
only instrumental importance, namely helping maintain peace (if 
they do). If human rights are supposed to be an “instrument” of 
anything, it is furthering human dignity and human well-being; 
some argue that the value of human rights is intrinsic, not 
instrumental.7 Furthermore, viewing human rights through the lens 
of peace and its preservation could lead to lax enforcement of rights 
whenever enforcement threatens the peace – for example, under-
enforcing the rights of refugees because full enforcement of their 
human rights provokes political turmoil in states whose citizens 
don’t want them. Peace and human rights are distinct pillars of the 
UN Charter for good reason.8 
Even so, the UDHR, like the two binding human rights 
covenants, does assert that human rights recognition is “the 
foundation of peace in the world,” and that is the rights-peace 
hypothesis. Put in other words, even if protecting the peace is not 
                                               
6 Mary Caprioli & Peter F. Trumbore, “Human Rights Rogues in Interstate 
Disputes, 1980-2001,” Journal of Peace Research 43(2) (2006): 131-48; Caprioli 
& Trumbore, “Identifying ‘Rogue’ States and Testing Their International Conflict 
Behavior,” European Journal of International Relations 9(3)(2003): 377-406; 
David M. Sobek et al., “The Human Rights Peace: How the Respect for Human 
Rights at Home Leads to Peace Abroad,” Journal of Politics 68(3)(2006): 519-
29; Timothy M. Peterson & Leah Graham, “Shared Human Rights Norms and 
Military Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(2): 248-73; Michael Tomz 
& Jessica L. P. Weeks, “Human Rights and Public Support of War,” draft Nov. 
2015, at https://web.stanford.edu/~tomz/working/TomzWeeks-HumanRights-
2015-11-17.pdf. This evidence is at best suggestive, however. 
7 On this point, see the overview of instrumental versus non-instrumental 
justifications of human rights in Rowan Cruft, S. Matthew Liao, and Massimo 
Renzo, “The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights: An Overview,” in 
Cruft, Liao, and Renzo, eds., Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights ( 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 11-18. 
8 The other preambular pillars are promotion of the international law and 
promotion of “social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.” UN 
Charter, Preamble. 
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the primary purpose of a human rights regime, it is very much a 
secondary purpose – a hoped-for collateral benefit. 
 Though they were loath to admit it, the UN’s framers no 
doubt understood that protecting human rights would require more 
than creating an international organization of states. It would require 
those states to cede at least a few of their sovereign powers.9 Not 
only would they henceforth “refrain from the threat or use of force” 
against one another, they would place at least some enforcement 
powers in the hands of the Security Council. Eventually, through the 
core human rights treaties, most states bound themselves to honor 
human rights domestically, and some of those treaties created 
mechanisms of external monitoring and enforcement. To abandon 
even these smidgens of sovereignty – the privilege of launching 
wars and the privilege of violating the human rights of their own 
people – required states to step back from the fiercest forms of 
nationalism. 
 Today, the United Nations is only one node of a vast network 
of international organizations, NGOs, tribunals, treaty regimes, and 
regional bodies that together make up the postwar international 
order. Some are creatures of the UN, but most are not. I nevertheless 
speak of “the UN order” for short, as a symbol or synecdoche of an 
entire postwar international order. The point is that this order shares 
the UN’s founding aims of peace and human rights.10 
                                               
9 It might be objected that joining the UN by ratifying its Charter has no effect on 
sovereignty. It is no different from joining any other treaty: both are consensual 
exercises of the sovereign privilege of entering into binding treaties, and whatever 
obligations states undertake should be regarded as exercises of their sovereign 
power, not limitations of it. See S.S. Wimbledon (U.K. v. Japan), 1923 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A) No. 1 (Aug. 17), at 35. Why is joining the UN different? The answer is 
twofold. First, the Charter requires UN member states to carry out decisions of 
the Security Council (art. 25), so in effect the member states have granted the 
Council legislative power – a point that alarmed observers in connection with 
Resolution 1373, the post-9/11 Security Council decision that dictated a detailed 
list of anti-terrorist measures that states were bound to enact. U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1373 (2001). See Stefan Talmon, “The Security Council as World 
Legislature,” American Journal of International Law 99 (2005): 175-193. Second, 
obligations under the Charter take precedence over obligations under any other 
international agreement (art. 103). 
10 Steven Ratner argues that peace and human rights are the twin pillars of all 
morally defensible contemporary international law. Ratner, The Thin Justice of 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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 Now I admit that I have just told a naïve and idealized story. 
Anyone who studies the diplomatic history quickly understands that 
there was a great deal of ruthless Machiavellian calculation involved 
in the UN project. In 1945, imperial powers had no intention of 
relinquishing their colonies, and great powers had no intention of 
letting weaker powers tell them what to do, nor to raise claims of 
economic justice against them.11 Not all states shared the founding 
faith in individual human rights, and in the General Assembly vote 
on the UDHR, ten states refrained from voting or abstained. The 
philosophical basis of human dignity and human rights remains as 
contestable as ever; Jacques Maritain, surveying intellectuals and 
spiritual leaders on what the UDHR should contain, commented that 
“we agree about the rights but on condition no one asks us why.”12 
 I nevertheless want to take the UN Charter and UDHR 
language seriously. Even the most ruthless cynics sitting in 
Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco were genuinely horrified by the 
untold sorrow of the war and wanted to do something so a world war 
would not happen again. And I believe that at least some of those 
ruthless cynics were genuinely nauseated by the assaults the human 
dignity they had witnessed in the war. Even if they didn’t believe 
the noble words they put in the Preamble, millions of their own 
people did and still do, and that creates a political check on 
governments.13  
 Today, the UN is beset by problems; it is weak, politically 
fractured, underfunded, at least slightly corrupt, and often helpless. 
And the UN order is under attack from many directions. That raises 
two fundamental questions for any discussion of international 
governance issues that shares the UN order’s axiomatic treatment of 
peace and human rights: What are the prospects for peace and 
human rights today? And does the rights-peace hypothesis have any 
continued plausibility, as many hoped in the optimistic 1990s? All 
                                               
11 For a skeptical view of the UDHR’s world view, see Martti Koskenniemi, “The 
Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” in Gudmundur 
Alfredsson & Asbjørn Eide, eds., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A 
Common Standard of Achievement (Martinus Nijhoff, 1999): 27-39. 
12 Jacques Maritain, Human Rights: Concepts and Interpretations (London: 
Wingate, 1949), 9. 
13 For careful assessment of the efficacy of human rights instruments, see Beth A. 
Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics 
(Cambridge University Press: 2009). Simmons argues that they are efficacious 
when they are able to mobilize locals. 
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of us know that the world today is in retreat from what is 
alternatively called “globalism,” “cosmopolitanism,” and “liberal 
internationalism.”14 Some states commit grotesque human rights 
violations on a massive scale, without apology and with seeming 
impunity. Where does that leave us today? 
 One cause of anti-globalism is widespread fear that liberal 
internationalism poses a dark threat to national sovereignty. This has 
been a theme for Euroskeptics for many years, but we might date the 
rise of its political clout in Europe to June 2005, when in a national 
referendum Dutch voters rejected a proposed European constitution. 
This surprise was a first warning shot across the bows of a European 
unification project that until then had seemed nearly inevitable. On 
national sovereignty grounds, the United States bitterly rejects the 
ICC’s authority to prosecute U.S. nationals. Russia and China 
denounce criticism of their human rights records on sovereignty 
grounds. 
Superficially, concern about sovereignty violations sounds like 
a legal objection, but it is really political rather than legal, because 
sovereignty is hardly a well-defined legal concept. In the complaint 
of one eminent international lawyer, Louis Henkin: “I don’t like the 
‘S word.’ Its birth is illegitimate, and it has not aged well. The 
meaning of ‘sovereignty’ is confused and its uses are various, some 
even destructive of human values.”15 Like it or not, though, the S 
word looms large in political discourse and the political imagination, 
and suspicion that a nefarious global order has plans to “take our 
sovereignty away” packs emotional power reminiscent of Freudian 
castration anxiety. Unsurprisingly, sovereignty conceptions 
sometimes drive legal arguments in unarticulated ways. It will be 
useful to delve more deeply into some of the varied meanings of 
sovereignty. 
2. The sovereign state as peacekeeper 
  Three centuries before the construction of the UN order, 
another political innovation created an international order: the 
                                               
14 For a pessimistic recent view, Bruce W. Jentleson, “The Liberal Order Isn’t 
Coming Back: What Next?”, Democracy: A Journal of Ideas 48, Spring 2018, 
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/48/the-liberal-order-isnt-coming-back-
what-next/. 
15 Louis Henkin, “That ‘S’ Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human 
Rights, Et Cetera,” 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1 (1999). 
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sovereign nation-state, epitomized in the Peace of Westphalia. 16 It 
too emerged from a horrific war and aimed to restore the peace. 
Even though it originated in Europe, the sovereign state proved easy 
to transplant: in the era of decolonization, former colonies 
understandably yearned for their own sovereignty. Today they guard 
it jealously, indeed just as jealously as the great powers guard theirs. 
The UN itself is based on the principle of sovereign equality. 
Early state-making involved four elements: the 
consolidation of small political units into large ones; the 
accompanying creation (often by force) of an allegedly unitary 
“people” out of all the disparate local groups in the state’s territory; 
the replacement of overlapping jurisdictions by territorial states with 
exclusive and unlimited authority within their own territory; and the 
state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. Hobbes called 
the result “that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more 
reverently, … that mortal god to which we owe … our peace and 
defence.”17 By the nineteenth century, nationalism had become the 
ideology of the nation-state; it is the assertion of peoplehood and 
self-determination, and peoples without states yearn for mortal gods 
of their own. Sovereignty of this sort combines a domestic (or 
internal) principle giving the state the privilege not to be resisted by 
its own people with an international (or external) principle granting 
states immunity against outside intervention. Together, domestic 
and international sovereignty constitute the two familiar faces of 
“Westphalian” sovereignty, sometimes labeled “sovereignty as 
control.” With it comes the consensualist model of international law 
that emerged in the 19th century, according to which states are bound 
only by those rules of international law to which they have 
consented.18 
Nation-states waged brutal wars, but the nation-state may 
have succeeded in reducing overall violence, because of its efficacy 
                                               
16 Treaty of Münster, art. 64-65 (1648), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp. 
17 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Michael Oakeshot, ed. (Oxford:  Basil Blackwell, 
1957), p. 112 (ch. 17). 
18 The standard, classic statement of the consensualist theory is the majority 
opinion in the Lotus decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice. S.S. 
Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). 
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at the Leviathan function of suppressing private violence as well as 
defending against public violence.19 
But, as we all know, the DNA of the sovereign state 
contained genes with deadly potential. Under the consensualist 
theory of international law, states retained the right to make war, 
unless they ceded the right of their own volition. With good reason, 
Kant likened international lawyers who endorsed this right to Job’s 
“sorry comforters” (Job 16:2), the three “friends” who explained to 
Job why his sufferings were justly inflicted.20 Most dramatically, the 
state’s exclusive authority over its own people allowed it to turn 
against them and commit what we now call “crimes against 
humanity.” And the legal principle of sovereign equality (par in 
parem non habet imperium) meant that a state cannot be held to legal 
account by other states.21 These enabled the nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century pathologies of sovereignty, culminating in the 
untold sorrow of the world wars, which the UN order, with its 
prohibition on the use of force, its emphasis on human rights, and 
its international tribunals, hoped to eradicate. 
There are obvious and dramatic failures of the UN order to 
maintain the peace – in the 1990s Balkans, in Africa, in the Middle 
East, in Myanmar and the Philippines. But in comparison with other 
eras, the project of tweaking the DNA of Westphalian sovereignty 
succeeded. The databases compiled by the Oslo Peace Research 
                                               
19 E.g., Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has 
Declined (Viking: 2011). Much in Pinker’s account is controversial. For a useful 
overview of the evidence for and against Pinker’s (and others’) thesis of high 
violence in pre-state societies, see Robert M. Sapolsky, Behave: The Biology of 
Humans at Our Best and Worst (Penguin: 2017), 306-25. Sapolsky finds “the 
cleanest assessment” of warfare and other lethal violence in hunter-gatherer 
societies in Douglas P. Fry and Patrik Söderberg, “Lethal Aggression in Mobile 
Forager Bands and Implications for the Origins of War,” Science 341 (19 July 
2013): 270-73 and Christopher Boehm, Moral Origins: The Evolution of Virtue, 
Altruism, and Shame (Basic Books, 2012). Neither supports Pinker’s thesis. 
Obviously, the issue of whether the nation-state reduced overall violence (internal 
and external) as compared with its political predecessors is independent from the 
issue of violence levels in hunter-gatherer societies. 
20 Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace (1795), 8:355, in Kant, Practical 
Philosophy (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant), Mary J. 
Gregor ed. and trans., (Cambridge University Press: 1996), 326. 
21 It still does. See Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, [2001] ECHR 35763/97, 21 
Nov. 2001, §54 (holding that the par in parem principle applies even when a state 
violates jus cogens). 
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Institute and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program show that both in 
number and deadliness, warfare declined dramatically in the UN era 
– although, as mentioned earlier, this trend has reversed since 2010. 
Annual battle deaths have fallen off by 90% since the late 1940s.22 
Today’s conflict-ridden world remains, astonishingly, among the 
most peaceful in recent history.  
An important caution is in order here. The absence of direct 
physical violence (so-called negative peace) by no means indicates 
the absence of structural violence (positive peace).23 My claim that 
today’s world is among the most peaceful in recent history refers 
solely to negative peace; we are still a long way away from positive 
peace.  
3. Sovereigns as robbers, gods, and protectors 
We might think that the state is an improbable instrument for 
keeping peace. One classic view holds that a state is nothing but a 
criminal enterprise that has defeated other criminal enterprises and 
been legitimated by time and habit. In The City of God, Augustine 
writes: “What are kingdoms but great bands of robbers? What are 
bands of robbers themselves but little kingdoms? … If … [a band of 
robbers] acquires territory … and subjugates peoples, it assumes the 
name of kingdom more openly.”24 David Hume concurs: “Almost 
all the governments which exist at present, or of which there remains 
any record in story, have been founded originally, either on 
usurpation or conquest, or both.” In Hume’s eyes, people obey 
Leviathan out of unreflective habit, not consent, and Leviathan 
secures its dominion “by employing, sometimes, violence, 
                                               
22 Pinker, 302. See the UDCP/PRIO data summarized by Pinker, 298-305. See 
also Katherine Sikkink, Evidence for Hope: Making Human Rights Work in the 
21st Century (Princeton University Press, 2017), 186-88. For detailed data on 
intrastate wars, see Jeffrey S. Dixon & Meredith Reid Sarkees, A Guide to Intra-
State Wars: An Examination of Civil, Regional, and Intercommunal Wars, 1816-
2014 (Sage Publications, 2016), a product of the long-running Correlates of War 
project. 
23 On the distinction between negative and positive peace, see, e.g., Devon Curtis, 
“Introduction: The Contested Politics of Peacebuilding in Africa,” in Devon 
Curtis & Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa, eds., Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa 
(Ohio University Press, 2012), 6.  
24 The City of God, Bk. IV, ch. 4, R. W. Dyson, ed. & trans. (Cambridge UP: 
1998), 147-48. 
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sometimes false pretences.”25 Charles Tilly updates Augustine’s 
robber theory with a different criminal analogy: “If protection 
rackets represent organized crime at its smoothest, then war risking 
and state making – quintessential protection rackets with the 
advantage of legitimacy – qualify as our largest examples of 
organized crime.”26 States put their people at risk of war and then 
extort wealth and obedience as the price of protection. 
Call this cynical line of thought the deflationary view of the 
state. It certainly corresponds with one strand of international law – 
the doctrine that sovereignty over a territory requires effective 
control, with no additional requirement of good governance or even 
mediocre governance.27 Even deflated states with no concern for 
their residents’ well-being or rights enjoy sovereign equality with 
other states so long as they effectively control their territory and 
people. 
At the other extreme from the deflationary view are those 
who identify the state with the nation (that is, the people), and view 
it with reverence, as if it were a god – a political theology closely 
identified with nationalism.28 Call this the romantic view of the state, 
                                               
25 Both quotes from David Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” in Essays: Moral 
and Political, Eugene F. Miller ed. (Liberty Classics: 1985), 471. 
26 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organised Crime,” in 
Bringing the State Back In, Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, & Theda 
Skocpol, eds. (Cambridge UP: 1985), 169. 
27 The classic legal statement is Max Huber’s Island of Palmas arbitral decision, 
2 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 869 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). The dispute is noteworthy: it 
was an argument between the United States and the Netherlands over who owns 
this tiny island (also known as Miangas) located between the Philippines and 
Indonesia. The U.S. argument was based on the idea that Spain “discovered” the 
island in 1526 and claimed it, ceding it to the United States after the Spanish-
American War. The Dutch claim was that it had ruled the East Indies, including 
Miangas, since 1677. Huber found for the Netherlands because it had exercised 
effective control; and by that (he explains) is meant effective protection of foreign 
interests. Even the bare hint that the 750 residents of Miangas should have a say 
is absent from the decision – as is the idea that effective control might require 
good governance from the inhabitants’ point of view. 
28 Some have argued that statism is not a secularized theology but the opposite: a 
deification of the secular state. E.g., Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two 
Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton UP, 1957); Carl 
Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (1922); 
Paul W. Kahn, Political Theology: Four New Chapters on the Concept of 
Sovereignty (Columbia UP: 2011) and Sacred Violence: Torture, Terror, and 
Sovereignty (U. Michigan Press: 2009). 
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although one might also label it the overinflated view of the state. 
All too frequently, the opposites meet: tyrants and kleptocrats 
invoke the romance of the nation-state as a smokescreen for what is 
in reality a large criminal enterprise. 
Is there any way to pump oxygen into the deflated state 
without embracing the metaphysical and theological excesses of the 
romantic view? The best-known answer in the spirit of the UDHR 
is that what begins as a band of criminals becomes a legitimate 
sovereign not simply by controlling territory, but by respecting and 
promoting the human rights of its people. Kofi Annan articulated 
this view in his 1999 address to the UN’s General Assembly:  
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being 
redefined …. The State is now widely understood to 
be the servant of its people, and not vice-versa. At 
the same time, individual sovereignty – and by this I 
mean the human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
each and every individual -- … has been enhanced.29 
This view of state legitimacy through human rights is usually 
called “conditional sovereignty,” or “sovereignty as responsibility” 
(the latter term coined by Francis Deng three years before Annan’s 
speech).30 These are subtly different concepts, but for our purposes 
we can treat them both as articulations of Annan’s reformulation of 
sovereignty.31 The condition of sovereignty under this conception is 
that states are servants of their peoples, and in particular, protectors 
of their human rights; and sovereign responsibility is a responsibility 
to respect, protect, and fulfill its own peoples’ rights. 
An important caveat is in order. Deng’s and Annan’s 
reformulation of sovereignty as responsibility does not mean that 
despotic states that violate the condition will not enjoy international 
recognition of their statehood. Diplomacy with despotic or 
otherwise illegitimate governments is just as crucial as it is with 
those that are servants of their people. The criteria of statehood must 
                                               
29 Secretary General Address, Sept. 20, 1999, at 
https://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990920.sgsm7136.html. 
30 Francis M. Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in 
Africa (Brookings, 1996). 
31 “Conditional sovereignty” suggests that the baseline concept of sovereignty 
remains Westphalian, with side-constraints – conditions – layered onto it. 
“Sovereignty as responsibility” is closer to Deng’s and Annan’s idea, that baseline 
sovereignty itself has metamorphosed away from Westphalian sovereignty. 
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therefore remain those of the 1933 Montevideo Convention: a 
permanent population in a defined territory, a government (good, 
bad, or ugly), and capacity to enter into relations with other states.32 
But recognizing a despotism as a state is not the same as conceding 
a sovereign right of its government to behave despotically.33 Like 
all states, despotisms are protected under the Charter from military 
aggression, so declaring that they fail the test of sovereignty as 
responsibility does not license a free-for-all for invaders. But they 
cannot invoke sovereignty to shield them from lesser forms of 
international pressure, for example “outcasting” them for their 
human rights failings.34 
The Deng-Annan formulation of sovereignty is 
contemporary, as is the focus on human rights; but the idea is much 
older. Earlier I quoted Augustine’s memorable description of 
kingdoms as great bands of robbers – but I intentionally left off the 
beginning of his sentence: “Justice removed then, what are 
kingdoms but great bands of robbers?” Just kingdoms are a different 
matter. James Turner Johnson has argued that the notion of 
sovereignty as responsibility for the common good has medieval 
roots.35  
Even so, sovereignty as responsibility struck many as a 
dramatic change from the conception of sovereignty that had 
prevailed for more than a century. The diplomats in the audience for 
Annan’s speech gave it a chilly reception – perhaps the best 
evidence of how novel it seemed. 
4. The new threats to peace 
Can the sovereign state, under either conception of 
sovereignty, maintain the peace under present conditions? My 
answer is no. As I will argue, today’s threats to peace transcend the 
boundaries and powers of states, even states committed to human 
rights. To respond to them, we need a third conception of 
sovereignty, which expands state responsibilities to include a 
                                               
32 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), art. 1. 
33 I am grateful to Miriam Gur-Arye and Carlos Vazquez for suggesting this 
clarification. 
34 Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, “Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic 
and International Law,” Yale Law Journal 121 (2011): 252-349. 
35 James Turner Johnson, Sovereignty: Moral and Historical Perspectives 
(Georgetown University Press, 2014), 9. See, for example, the passages from 
Aquinas quoted on pp. 38-39. 
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responsibility to cooperate across borders to control transnational 
threats to peace.36 
What are those threats? To answer that question, I draw from 
demographers, futurologists, but above all from writings by people 
whose business it is to foresee future threats to peace: military 
planners looking twenty or more years out.37 My discussion focuses 
on two factors: social conditions that generate armed conflicts, and 
new military technologies. 
 I begin the story with what surely counts as one of the 
greatest human rights achievements in history: the dramatic fall in 
global poverty in the last half-century. In 1970, 60% of the world’s 
population lived in extreme poverty; today it is less than 10%.38 The 
                                               
36 By transnational threats I don’t mean solely exogenous threats emanating from 
foreign sources. Transnational threats include endogenous behaviors that induce 
other states to respond in such a way that the result harms the prospects for peace. 
For example, a high-consuming developed state might promote commercial 
practices in weaker, resource-cursed developing states that elicit violence and 
instability – in which case the seemingly-exogenous threat emanating from a civil 
war in the weaker state could also, and rightly, be regarded as endogenous to the 
developed state. My thanks to Sarah Nouwen for emphasizing this point. 
37 The most useful I have found is the UK Ministry of Defence’s Global Strategic 
Trends – Out to 2045. Fifth edition, 2014, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/3
48164/20140821_DCDC_GST_5_Web_Secured.pdf. I also draw on similar 
documents produced by the U.S. intelligence community and think-tanks: U.S. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operating Environment 2035 (JOE 2035): The Joint 
Force in a Contested and Disordered World, July 14, 2016, at 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joe/joe_2035_july16.pdf; David T. Miller, 
Defense 2045: Assessing the Future Security Environment and Implications for 
Defense Policymakers, Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS)(Rowman & Littlefield: Nov. 2015), at https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/151106_Miller_Defense2045_Web.pdf; 
Atlantic Council, Global Risks 2035: The Search for a New Normal (2016), at 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Global_Risks_2035_web_0
922.pdf; U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC),  Global Trends 2030: 
Alternative Worlds (Dec. 2012), at 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf. Long-range 
forecasts are almost certain to be unreliable – on this point, see Philip Tetlock and 
Dan Gardner, Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction (Broadway 
Books, 2015). So these studies should be regarded as projections of current trends 
rather than predictions. 
38 See, e.g., The Visual History of World Poverty, slide 12, at 
https://ourworldindata.org/slides/world-poverty/#/declining-world-poverty-
1820-2015-step1; World Bank Poverty and Equity Data, at 
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fall in poverty can be attributed to industrialization, technology, and 
advances in agriculture. Not only has poverty fallen, life 
expectancies have risen dramatically. For example, a Frenchwoman 
today has a life expectancy 40 years longer than a century ago.39  
As economies shift from agriculture to industry and service, 
another noteworthy change occurs: having many children 
transforms from an economic benefit to the family into an economic 
cost. In a traditional agricultural economy children can do farm 
work from an early age. In an urban, technological economy, 
children require longer periods of education and training before they 
enter the workforce – fifteen to seventeen years, according to the 
United Nations.40 A ten-child family changes from a source of 
wealth into a source of poverty.41 
One consequence is the remarkable fall in fertility in most of 
the world that defused the Malthusian “population bomb” predicted 
in the 1960s. Another consequence is that women no longer spend 
their entire lives bearing and rearing children, freeing them to pursue 
other ambitions – an economic and material condition that helps 
fulfill the UN order’s commitment to the equal rights of women.42 
This is not only a human rights advance, but also a benefit for peace: 
there is evidence that states with greater gender equality are less 
likely to resort to first use of force in international crises than states 
where domestic gender inequality is greater.43 One analyst offers 
women’s enfranchisement as a partial explanation: women voters 
are less supportive of warfare than men – five to fifteen percent less, 
according to surveys in Western democracies. That is enough to 
make politicians responsive.44 
Yet these advances generate new threats to peace, in the 
form of unintended consequences, and these are what I want to focus 
                                               
http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/home/. Not only is the percentage 
living in extreme poverty lower, the absolute numbers have fallen by two-thirds 
since 1970. 
39 National Institute of Aging, WHO, et al., Global Health and Aging (2011), 
Figure 4, at 
https://www.nia.nih.gov/sites/default/files/global_health_and_aging.pdf. 
40 George Friedman, The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century (Anchor 
Books: 2009), p. 55. 
41 Friedman, p. 56. 
42 Friedman, 55-61. 
43 Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2045, 5-6. 
44 Azar Gat, War In Human Civilization (Oxford University Press: 2006), 606-07. 
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on. Better health and greater longevity allow older workers to work 
longer. But that has the unintended consequence of freezing youth 
out of job markets – and youth unemployment is a source of social 
unrest and a trigger of violence. Automation likewise kills low-skill 
jobs, and this will become even more pronounced as artificial 
intelligence becomes more sophisticated. Competition from women 
in the workforce puts an additional squeeze on the prospects of 
young men – and young men have always been the most violent 
segment of humanity. 
One result is a backlash against women’s rights, typically 
encouraged by traditional religions with their obsessive focus on 
sexual morality and the control of women. Another is hatred of 
immigrants and resentment of foreigners, who are seen (often 
wrongly) as economic competitors. In the developed world, 
unemployed young men threaten social stability; in the developing 
world, demobilized soldiers and militiamen who have no skills 
except fighting pose a perpetual menace. Meanwhile, the aging 
population strains the resources of the developed world. 
Next consider the world-wide tendency toward intense 
urbanization. Already, city-dwellers outnumber rural populations, 
and by 2030 sixty percent of the world’s population will live in 
cities. The Chinese government forecasts that in China alone, 
somewhere between 250 and 300 million people will move from 
rural to urban areas in the next fifteen years.45 The number of mega-
cities with populations over 10 million has tripled in the last quarter 
century, and the UN predicts that by 2030 there will be 41 mega-
cities, mostly in the global South.46 
The problem is that many of these cities will contain vast 
slums and shantytowns, with distressed infrastructures and bad 
water. In regions where central governments are weak, these slums 
will be nearly ungovernable, plagued by crime and violence, and 
filled with desperate, restless people. Overcrowding makes disease 
more likely to spread, and travelers can turn local epidemics into 
global pandemics. Pandemics are not only a devastating threat to 
                                               
45 Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2045, 17. 
46 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 





well-being, they are a threat to stability as well, carrying the 
possibility of panics and military responses.  
By now we are all familiar with the threat that climate 
change poses not only to well-being but also to peace. In broadest 
terms, climate change will make some parts of the Earth, especially 
the poorest, unable to sustain their human populations. Coastal 
plains will flood; semi-arid regions will become deserts. If 
catastrophic storms proliferate, ever-larger numbers of people will 
be internally displaced. Other forms of environmental degradation 
and pollution threaten water supplies. One research team claims that 
two-thirds of the world’s people currently face severe water 
shortages.47 Already, the Chinese government reports that four-
fifths of the well water in China is unfit to drink or bathe in.48  
The threat to peace arising from these developments is 
obvious: environmental and climate refugees will flee from 
unlivable regions into countries that don’t want them, and in some 
cases cannot support them – an invitation to violence, confinement, 
or even genocide. Those who cannot leave may plunge their 
countries into civil conflicts, as in Darfur during the drought of the 
early 2000s.49 Obviously, civil conflicts themselves can and do 
create mass migrations of refugees. Today there are more than 20 
million refugees, and twice that number of internally displaced 
persons.50 
Growing economic inequality between rich and poor states 
is likely to intensify migration. For that matter, growing inequality 
                                               
47 Nicholas St. Fleur, “Two-Thirds of the World Faces Severe Water Shortages,” 
New York Times, Feb. 12, 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/13/science/two-thirds-of-the-world-faces-
severe-water-shortages.html. 
48 “Four-fifths of China’s water from wells ‘unsafe because of pollution’,” The 
Guardian, April 12, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/apr/12/four-fifths-of-chinas-
water-from-wells-unsafe-because-of-pollution. 
49 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Sudan: Post-Conflict 
Environmental Assessment (2007), 8, at 
https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_Sudan.pdf . This report can be 
faulted for ignoring the political and social causes of the conflict. 
50 UNHCR, Figures At A Glance, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-
glance.html. 
 19 
within states is a world-wide phenomenon.51 Endemic corruption in 
many parts of the world contributes to inequality. A U.S. military 
forecast warns that weak states will collapse into failed states 
through “a mix of real or perceived corruption, economic inequality, 
and ethnic/religious discrimination.” As a result, “violence is likely 
to occur in the form of sectarian strife, insurgency, or civil war.”52 
The final threat to peace that I want to discuss is the 
development of new military technologies. In doing so, I will set to 
one side the dangers of nuclear war – not because these are 
unimportant, but because they are obvious.53 Instead, I will focus on 
a different set of developments: the proliferation of inexpensive, 
dangerous, and small-scale technologies outside the control of 
states. Gabriella Blum and Ben Wittes have labeled this proliferation 
the democratization of violence.54 I will borrow their phrase. 
The most obvious democratizers of violence are small arms 
and explosives – hardly novel technologies. But advanced hacking 
tools are a relatively new development, and the more societies come 
to depend on computers to control their infrastructures, the more 
vulnerable they become to hackers.55 Cybertheft and ransomware 
already assault individuals and businesses. Internet predators extort 
sex by threatening to release images stolen from their victims’ social 
media – a crime common enough to have acquired its own name: 
sextortion. These are all threats to individual rights, but they are also 
threats to peace if states suspect that hackers might be hostile states 
concealing themselves as private criminals, or if hacker host-states 
are unwilling to repress their activity. State-against-state 
cyberwarfare has so far proven impossible to regulate, for both 
technical and strategic reasons.56 If carried out on a large scale, hack 
                                               
51 Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, “Inequality in the Long Run,” Science 344 
(May 23, 2014), 838-43, 
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/344/6186/838.full. 
52 JOE-35, p. 8. 
53 What is far from obvious is whether the existential deterrence that worked in 
the bilateral world of the Cold War can also work in a world with multilateral 
nuclear antagonists. That issue is beyond the scope of this essay. 
54 Benjamin Wittes & Gabriella Blum, The Future of Violence: Robots and Germs, 
Hackers and Drones (Basic Books: 2015), 115. 
55 Wittes & Blum, 54. 
56 The group of legal experts who wrote the most thorough treatment of 
international law and cyberwarfare, the Tallinn 2.0 Manual, left many areas of 
disagreement, even on the foundational question of whether respect for state 
sovereignty is a binding legal rule rather than a non-binding principle. 
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attacks on hospitals, power grids, cell phone networks, GPS 
systems, aircraft, and computer-regulated dams and water stations 
could create mass casualties – and both state and non-state actors 
could carry out such attacks. On an entirely different technological 
front, biological weapons that attack food crops could cause 
famines, and the science needed to develop them is available to non-
state actors.57 Electromagnetic pulse weapons may be capable of 
disabling communications satellites and GPS devices, as well as 
shutting down electrical grids. 
Closely related to other cyber-threats are the information 
wars that exploded into public consciousness in the wake of the 
2016 U.S. election. The possibility of hostile state or non-state 
actors manipulating big data and social media to sway elections, sow 
public discord, and spread fake facts is now reality. Visual images 
can be altered, and human voices impersonated – and the very fact 
that these technologies are matters of public knowledge itself 
contributes to a manipulable mistrust of shared public reality. 
As for state-on-state wars, they are likely to be quick and 
lethal.58 Missiles fly fast, and short-range missile defense systems 
like Israel’s Iron Dome will respond by becoming automated, 
creating the prospect of machine-driven escalations comparable to 
machine trading duels on the stock market. 
Next consider robotics. Miniaturized drones the size of 
insects already exist; I found one for sale on the Internet for $119.59 
Soon they will be equipped with surveillance cameras or, 
potentially, with weapons such as poison. Governments will have 
them, but so will extremist groups and mafias. For that matter, so 
will your creepy neighbor who uses his mini-drone to watch you on 
                                               
57 Tom Daschle & Richard B. Myers, “A Threat to the Food System,” U.S. News 
& World Report, Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-
10-17/americas-food-supply-and-national-security-are-at-risk-to-bioterrorism.  
On the more familiar issue of bioterrorism against humans, see, e.g., Christopher 
Chyba, “Biological terrorism and public health,” in Survival 43(1)(2001): 93-106. 
58 In this connection, the sobering techno-thriller Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next 
World War (Eamon Dolan: 2016), co-written by military analysts P. W. Singer 
and August Cole, offers a fictional glimpse, and a full set of footnotes 
documenting the technologies it discusses. 
59 Jon Gabay, “Tiny, insect-like drones may be the future of surveillance,” 




his smart phone as you undress, and then posts the video on 
Facebook.60  
Militaries are researching biological enhancers that can 
make soldiers stronger, faster, unsleeping, and nearly impervious to 
pain. Cognitive enhancements and drugs that deaden sympathetic 
emotions are also on the table. I have no idea whether my own 
government is pursuing such weapons; but three years ago a U.S. 
defense official stated that “our adversaries quite frankly are 
pursuing enhanced human operations and it scares the crap out of 
us, really. … We’re going to have a big, big decision on whether 
we’re comfortable going that way.”61 Once enhancements come into 
state military use, it will be impossible to keep them out of the hands 
of warlords, mercenaries, and crime cartels. Non-state actors will 
churn out weapons with 3D printers. Their enhanced foot soldiers 
will wear night-vision goggles and lightweight graphene body armor 
stronger than steel. States may respond with autonomous weapons 
systems that choose their own targets – so-called “killer robots” 
whose regulation UN-sponsored experts are only beginning to 
explore.62 
Welcome to my nightmares. 
On the other hand, defensive capabilities will also be widely 
dispersed among private actors.63 Governments already rely on 
private security firms to fight hackers, and NGOs operating in 
conflict zones hire private military contractors to protect them. You 
can defend yourself against insect drones with an electric fan or a 
fly-swatter (if you know the drone is there). 
The net result of all these developments is an enormous 
challenge to the sovereign nation-state’s monopoly on the legitimate 
means of violence. As Hobbes foresaw, that monopoly rests on a 
promise that Leviathan will protect our security. But what if it can’t, 
and what if private entities almost can? Blum and Wittes ask a 
cogent question: “Can the state endure once it is unable to prevent 
                                               
60 Blum & Wittes, 44. 
61 Bob Work, “Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech, CNAS Defense Forum,” 
Dec. 14, 2015, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-
View/Article/634214/cnas-defense-forum/. 
62 The Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) has convened an expert 
group that, after three meetings, has come up with only tentative suggestions and 
inconclusive results. 
63 Blum & Wittes, chapter 3. 
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the electrical grid from being shut down, the lethal spider drone from 
attacking you in the shower, or new or manipulated biological 
agents produced in garages anywhere in the world from threatening 
your health?”64 Within a few years, the answer may be no. 
The fact is that territorial sovereignty and the public-private 
distinction, both basic conceptual features of the sovereign nation-
state, have already eroded to a significant degree. In many states, 
including strong states, traditional public functions are contracted 
out to private corporations; and large multinational corporations 
don’t respect territorial boundaries. Neither, for that matter, do 
transnational criminal networks (some of which perform some of the 
social-welfare functions of the state). While states will remain the 
pre-eminent actors on the world stage for the foreseeable future, the 
image of more or less self-contained territorial sovereigns is no 
longer accurate. 
This, I fear, would be true even if states did their best to keep 
the promise of respecting, protecting, and fulfilling their citizens’ 
human rights. The threats to peace brought on by climate change, 
mass migration, pandemics, and the democratization of violence 
transcend national boundaries. Other social generators of conflict – 
youth unemployment, intense urbanization in failing states, rising 
inequality, and the traditionalist backlash against women’s rights – 
may lie beyond the powers of any state to control unilaterally. 
5. Two objections 
 I foresee two objections to my description of upcoming 
threats to peace: that it ignores issues of injustice, and that the threats 
I have described are all, at bottom, threats to human rights – so that 
the project of guarding against them is simply an updated version of 
the UN project of peace through human rights.  
 Start with the first. You may have noticed that the words 
“justice” and “injustice” were absent from my catalogue of 
nightmares. I spoke only of future violence and what might instigate 
it, not of whether the violence might be justified. If young workers 
have no jobs, if millions of people live in desolate shantytowns with 
no way out, and if inequalities cascade, aren’t anger and disruption 
justified? Even the UDHR, which is hardly a militant manifesto, 
                                               
64 Ibid., 107. On this same theme, see Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline 
of the State (Cambridge University Press: 1999), especially 354-414. 
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warns that in the face of oppression “man [may be] compelled to 
have recourse to rebellion.” By contrast, antiseptic terms like 
“stability” and “instability” are the amoral vocabulary of defense 
intellectuals on the side of the status quo. 
 I accept that violence can sometimes be just; elsewhere I 
have argued that the struggle for basic human rights can be a just 
cause for war.65 But it hardly follows that the violence arising from 
the forecasts I’ve catalogued will be in the service of justice. 
Ransomware hackers are not freedom fighters. Biologically 
enhanced mercenary soldiers will fight for whoever pays them to 
fight. Criminal gangs armed with hi-tech weapons will kill for the 
reasons criminal gangs have always killed. And states have never 
waged wars to rectify economic injustices.  
Furthermore, righteous anger does not always lead to 
righteous violence. Violence is less rational than that. Urban rioters 
furious over injustice sometimes burn and loot their own 
neighborhoods. Unemployed, despairing men may take out their 
rage on the women who defy them, or on immigrants. Civil wars 
become wars of ethnic extermination; rebellions sometimes replace 
one set of kleptocrats with another. The point is not that justified 
violence couldn’t happen – it’s that much of the violence that will 
happen, even in a just cause, will not be justified. Indeed, it may be 
nearly impossible for a just rebellion to succeed without inflicting 
unjustified violence – for example, by forcibly conscripting 
footsoldiers, deliberately provoking government atrocities, or 
murdering rival leaders.66 And even a just war or rebellion waged in 
accordance with the jus in bello will be a human rights catastrophe. 
Homes are ruined, health care collapses, and decades of economic 
development are destroyed in a matter of weeks. 
 But, the second objection runs, all the scary trends I’ve 
described are fundamentally human rights problems. Economic 
rights, environmental rights, and the right to nationality are human 
rights on a par with rights to security against violence. If threats to 
these human rights are the future causes of violence and warfare, 
then the solution is what the UN order already aims at: respect, 
protect, and fulfill those rights. Recall that the rights-peace 
                                               
65 Luban, “Just War and Human Rights,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 9 (1980). 
66 I take these points from Allen Buchanan, “The Ethics of Revolution and Its 
Implications for the Ethics of Intervention,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 41(4) 
(2013): 294-303. 
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hypothesis claims that human rights will contribute to peace. Rather 
than challenging the rights-peace hypothesis, one might argue that 
today’s threats confirm it. 
 Again, it is hard to disagree in the abstract, although I 
suspect that labeling climate change or pandemics human rights 
violations is not a helpful extension of the core concept of human 
rights. Even if it were, the problem is that the UN order of 
conditional sovereignty envisages that each state will keep its own 
human rights house in order, with the international community 
functioning only as a complementary backstop – a point I elaborate 
in section 7 below.67 This model is palpably inadequate when the 
future threats to peace are thoroughly transnational. Whatever 
political structures evolve to cope with these threats will require a 
different way of conceptualizing state sovereignty and state 
responsibility. 
6. Sovereign responsibility to humanity: R2H 
 I don’t know what the institutional structures will be, any 
more than those who first conceptualized the United Nations knew 
what the UN order with its many satellite institutions would look 
like half a century later. But it does seem possible to search for a 
legal and philosophical conception of state sovereignty suitable for 
the world we are rapidly approaching. It must be a form of 
sovereignty as responsibility not only for the human rights of a 
state’s own citizens, but also responsibility for cooperating to 
control transnational threats to peace. Put another way, it is 
conditional sovereignty with an added condition: not only human 
rights protection at home, but also transnational cooperation to 
control emerging threats to peace (which may include cooperation 
to protect human rights abroad). 
 A few international lawyers have begun to conceptualize 
sovereignty along these lines. One proposal is Eyal Benvenisti’s 
                                               
67 I use the word “complementary” deliberately. In the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, “complementarity” means that states themselves are 
the first resort for investigating and prosecuting ICC crimes committed on their 
territory or by their nationals. See art. 1, 17. The ICC can admit only those cases 
that states are unwilling or unable to prosecute. In the same way that the ICC is 
“complementary to national jurisdiction” (art. 1), the UN scheme of conditional 
sovereignty envisages international human rights enforcement solely as a 
complement to national enforcement.  
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conception of sovereigns as trustees of humanity.68 Evan Criddle 
and Evan Fox-Decent have developed a closely related proposal 
under the title “fiduciaries of humanity.”69 There are differences 
between these proposals: Criddle and Fox-Decent focus principally 
on international organizations as fiduciaries of humanity, while 
Benvenisti focuses on states.70 As a legal matter, the concept of 
fiduciary responsibilities has wider scope than that of trusteeship, 
which exists only when a legal trust is formally established. For 
philosophical purposes, though, this difference is not crucial, 
because the heart of the responsibility is more or less the same: it 
involves responsibility to care for the interests of outsiders beyond 
the duty not to inflict unjustified harm, and beyond ordinary market 
relations between the parties.71  
In Benvenisti’s imagery, “In past decades the predominant 
conception of sovereignty was akin to owning a large estate 
separated from other properties by rivers or deserts. By contrast, 
today’s reality is more analogous to owning a small apartment in 
one densely packed high-rise that is home to two hundred separate 
families.”72 Living in a global apartment building imposes 
responsibility on each resident to others in the condominium, as well 
as mutual stewardship of the condominium as a whole.73 What those 
responsibilities entail may be unclear, but I suggest that at the very 
least, the residents are responsible for working together to alleviate 
threats to peace. 
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 The question for us to consider is whether concepts like 
“trustee of humanity” or “fiduciary of humanity” offer a cogent 
expression of these responsibilities. Some critics have complained 
that the concept of trusteeship reeks of colonialism and empire. 
Historically, it was the legal excuse for greedy European powers to 
rule the lives and territories of indigenous people. The foreign 
trustee governed a territory for the supposed benefit of an allegedly 
“immature” native population, until it gained the maturity for self-
determination. In reality trusteeship was a system of exploitation 
and condescension, masquerading as benevolence.74  
But I think it’s only the historical connotations of the word 
“trusteeship” that are objectionable, not the concept itself. That’s 
because the model changes dramatically once we think of 
sovereigns as trustees not of a colonized people, but of humanity. 
Crucially, today those former colonies are themselves sovereign 
states. Like all other states, they would exercise sovereignty over 
their own territory; but as trustees of humanity, they would do so 
with regard for the legitimate interests of outsiders – as would all 
other states. To say sovereigns are trustees of humanity means that 
each and every state is now the trustee, not only the beneficiary, in 
the relationship. Sovereign trustees of humanity are therefore 
nobody’s colonial or imperial subject, and so the fear of imperialism 
or colonialism is unfounded.  
Whatever the terminology, the root idea is an understanding 
that sovereignty entails responsibilities to humanity. I will use the 
abbreviation “R2H” for short, in parallel to the “R2P” abbreviation 
for the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. My focus is on one special 
case of R2H responsibilities: the responsibility to cooperate 
transnationally to manage threats to peace. But the more generalized 
conception of sovereignty underlying R2H seems well worth 
elaborating. 
7. From R2P to R2H 
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It will assist our understanding to compare R2H with R2P. 
The responsibility to protect doctrine originated with a 2001 report 
by a Canada-sponsored international group of experts (the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
“ICISS” for short) on the issue of humanitarian military intervention 
by outsiders in internal armed conflicts. This was a pressing issue in 
the wake of the Balkan Wars and Rwandan genocide. One key 
question was whether outside intervention can be reconciled with 
respect for the sovereignty of the conflict-ridden state, and ICISS 
answered yes. Echoing Deng and Annan, it argued that the UN order 
has transformed the Westphalian concept of sovereignty-as-control 
to sovereignty-as-responsibility, in particular responsibility to 
protect against gross violations of human rights.75 Sovereignty 
under either conception implies that states themselves bear primary 
responsibility to prevent humanitarian catastrophes within their 
borders, to react when they happen, and to rebuild in their wake. But 
under sovereignty-as-responsibility, the international community 
serves as a backstop when the state itself fails, with outside military 
intervention as a remedy of last resort if lesser measures of pressure 
or assistance prove unavailing. ICISS’s conceptual innovation is 
that once we reimagine sovereignty as responsibility rather than as 
control, outside intervention when a state will not or cannot 
discharge its responsibility to protect is no violation of its 
sovereignty. 
The UN General Assembly quickly picked up ICISS’s idea 
that states have a responsibility to protect their own people from 
“genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity” – the four core crimes in the Balkan and Rwandan 
calamities. Next the Security Council affirmed the doctrine.76 
According to this official UN version of R2P, the responsibility to 
protect against core crimes has the three prongs I indicated above. 
First, states themselves bear the primary responsibility to protect 
their people from the core crimes. Second, the international 
community, acting through the UN, has a responsibility “to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means … 
                                               
75 The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)(Dec. 2001)[hereafter: ICISS Report], 
§2.14, p. 13, available at 
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76 2005 World Summit Outcome, UNGA Res. 60/1, A/Res/60/1 (24 Oct. 2005), 
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to help to protect populations” against these crimes. Third, R2P 
authorizes states “to take collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the 
Charter” if all else fails. Such collective action includes military 
intervention as a last resort, and the Security Council invoked R2P 
when it authorized the use of force to protect civilians in Libya, and 
to restore order in the Central African Republic and in Mali.77 
This official UN version of R2P is narrower than the original 
ICISS proposal: the latter did not limit itself solely to the four core 
crimes (genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against 
humanity), but spoke more generally of “deadly conflict and other 
forms of man-made catastrophe.”78 Furthermore, ICISS emphasized 
the proactive responsibility to prevent humanitarian catastrophes, 
not merely to react to them; and it called on the international 
community to help distressed states alleviate the root causes of 
violent internal conflict through development aid and rule of law 
assistance.79 By contrast, the version of R2P endorsed by the 
Security Council is reactive, not proactive. 
Notwithstanding the pages it rightly devotes to prevention, 
the ICISS report unmistakably focuses on humanitarian military 
intervention when states fail in their responsibility to protect. That 
focus proved unfortunate. It means that in public discussions, R2P 
seems inevitably yoked to the last-resort remedy for humanitarian 
catastrophes: military force, prong three.80 Debates over 
humanitarian military interventions will always eclipse the less 
exciting responsibility to prevent catastrophes by alleviating their 
root causes. This should hardly surprise us; as the journalistic 
maxim puts it, if it bleeds it leads, and military intervention bleeds 
in a way that rule-of-law or development assistance never will. 
Regrettably, coupling R2P with humanitarian military intervention 
plays into the hands of cynical politicians who dislike the very idea 
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of sovereignty as responsibility: it allows them to oppose R2P on 
the ground that it is a cover for military aggression. 
The ICISS report focused on internal (“intra-state”) 
conflicts, and this too narrows its scope.81 Certainly genocide and 
ethnic cleansing within a state represent the most dramatic failure of 
the state’s responsibility to protect its people. But restricting R2P to 
internal conflicts suggests by negative implication that sovereigns 
have no responsibility to prevent inter-state (that is, international) 
conflicts, except via the UN Security Council, which is easily 
gridlocked by the P-5 veto power.82 
Thus, despite the worthy intentions of ICISS, R2P is too 
narrow, in three ways I’ve just identified:  
(1) it focuses only on protection against core crimes,  
(2) principally in internal conflicts;  
and – despite protestations to the contrary –  
(3) it deflects too much attention to humanitarian military 
intervention at the expense of less drastic remedies. 
Suppose, as a thought experiment, that we relax these 
limitations. Suppose that sovereignty as responsibility meant that 
sovereigns are responsible not just for atrocity-prevention but for 
broader enhancement of peace and human rights – and not just for 
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peace and human rights domestically, but internationally as well. 
Indeed, suppose that sovereignty as responsibility includes states’ 
responsibility to consider the global condominium in the conduct of 
all their affairs. In other words, expand the international 
community’s responsibilities under the second prong of R2P beyond 
humanitarian catastrophes to all matters of grave international 
concern. Finally, suppose that the modal response to states that 
violate their responsibility is legal and political, not military.  
That is R2H. If, gradually, R2H were to become our new 
“political imaginary” of sovereignty, the state responsibility to 
cooperate transnationally in order to manage emerging lethal threats 
would follow as a corollary. 
8. R2H and democracy 
Like other features of the political imagination, sovereignty 
concepts do not change overnight, and they obviously don’t change 
at the say-so of jurists and philosophers. They transform gradually 
and by inches, one micro-context at a time, responding to tangible 
needs; and each change presents itself as an unexciting tweak of the 
existing order, not a dramatic metamorphosis. For example, the 
World Trade Organization’s dispute-settlement tribunals have 
interpreted treaty language prohibiting members from 
discriminating against foreigners ambitiously, as an other-regarding 
obligation to take the interests of foreigners into account in 
policymaking.83 For trade specialists, this was perhaps a big deal; 
but for everyone else it was a small technocratic adjustment, or a 
“my eyes glaze over” minor news item. And yet, if in a few decades 
R2H became the reigning conception of sovereignty, this line of 
WTO cases might in hindsight seem like a significant precursor.  
Likewise, the Aarhus Convention, an environmental treaty among 
European and Central Asian nations, requires parties to provide 
access to information to citizens of other states party to the 
Convention.84 Viewed one way, this too is a baby step. Viewed 
another way, the gradual accretion of baby steps can take us long 
distances. 
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The notion of sovereigns as trustees or fiduciaries of 
humanity raises thorny questions of political theory, explored in a 
vast literature on global governance, sovereignty, and the rule of law 
that I cannot discuss here.85 It also raises thorny questions of 
practice. One, of course, is what incentive any state would have to 
fulfill its fiduciary obligations. The answer implicit in my argument 
is a form of enlightened self-interest: it’s the only way to keep the 
peace in the face of transnational threats that states cannot manage 
unilaterally. But as with many schemes of collective action, 
participants have rational incentives to defect and free ride, as 
climate change treaties illustrate. It will take great ingenuity in 
institutional design to overcome those incentives. 
A deeper question is whether responsibility to humanity is 
consistent with responsibility to one’s own people. What if a state’s 
responsibility to its own citizens’ welfare conflicts with its 
cosmopolitan responsibility as trustee of humanity? How should 
sovereign trustees weigh the interests of their own citizens against 
those of “humanity”? Benvenisti avoids this question by restricting 
his proposal to cases where sovereigns can benefit outsiders at no 
cost to their own peoples.86 What if satisfying cosmopolitan 
responsibilities cannot be done costlessly to one’s own people? 
The short answer is that one’s own people are themselves 
part of humanity – they, too, are the beneficiaries of sovereign 
trustees’ faithful husbandry. I have been emphasizing cosmopolitan 
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responsibilities to cooperate in managing threats to peace that 
transcend national borders. Managing those threats is in the 
medium-term self-interest of all peoples, even if cooperation 
requires short-term sacrifices and disruptions. The fiduciary 
responsibilities of states to their own people, like all fiduciary 
responsibilities, sometimes require balancing of the beneficiaries’ 
short-term and longer-term interests, and sometimes that requires 
making short-term sacrifices to preserve the beneficiaries’ situation 
over the long term. Doubly so when we consider that a sovereign’s 
responsibility to its own people includes future generations, whose 
interests must not be discounted simply because they are temporally 
distant.87 The sovereign fiduciary’s beneficiary includes the 
grandchildren of current citizens – grandchildren who face threats 
to peace that grow more terrifying the longer governments delay 
managing them. 
Notoriously, politicians focus on the near-term, not the 
further future – in part, no doubt, because the further future is hard 
to predict and therefore to plan for, but also for the less principled 
reason that unborn generations don’t vote. And voters are unlikely 
to support tangible sacrifices on behalf of intangible descendants. 
In that case, why not reject the idea that the democratic 
sovereign’s responsibilities to its people includes distant 
generations?88 To be sure, Edmund Burke wrote of “the great 
primeval contract of eternal society,” calling it a “partnership not 
only between those who are living, but between those who are 
living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.”89 Burke’s 
rhetoric is powerful, but is it true? Set aside the Burkean partnership 
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with one’s ancestors (“those who are dead”); our question is about 
the alleged partnership with one’s descendants – “those are to be 
born.” Do the living really have a “partnership” or “primeval 
contract” with them? What if the living don’t recognize any such 
partnership? 
One way to make the recognition vivid is to reflect that most 
people with children care about their children’s fates, believe 
themselves obligated to their children, and think their own happiness 
is bound up with the happiness of their children, as reflected in the 
folk-saying that you can’t be happier than your least happy child.90 
Then, if they think about it, they will grasp that their children will 
care similarly about their own children (assuming they have 
children) – creating a chain of carings that extends at least a few 
generations into the future. 
Consider as well a thought experiment proposed by Samuel 
Scheffler. Imagine that you somehow learned that thirty days after 
your own death an asteroid would destroy all human life – the 
“doomsday scenario.” What effect would that knowledge have on 
the meaningfulness of your daily strivings – everything from saving 
for your children’s education, to having children at all, to curing 
cancer, to voting, to prayer (other than prayer for a miracle that will 
spare humanity)? Scheffler believes that it would destroy that 
meaningfulness. If he is right, as seems plausible, the doomsday 
thought-experiment dramatizes how much the fate of our 
descendants matters to our current lives and projects.91 Reportedly, 
the entrepreneur Elon Musk wishes to start a utopian Mars colony 
large enough that if a catastrophe wipes out humanity on Earth, the 
human species will endure.92 Such reflexive yearning to perpetuate 
the human species, even after its reckless suicide, is an indicator of 
how deeply a collective afterlife matters to us. 
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All this is to say that the Burkean contract with future 
generations expresses something deeply rooted in the human 
condition, and thus that a sovereign’s responsibility to his or her or 
its people includes responsibility to those future generations – 
regardless of voters’ and politicians’ myopic short-termism. 
But what if a state’s own voters aren’t on board with R2H 
because they are indifferent or hostile to outsiders? If a country’s 
voters despise globalism, then R2H seems on a collision course with 
democratic self-governance. To this, too, there is a response: even 
under current international law there is no blanket right of 
democratic self-governance, if that means that democratic majorities 
get to do whatever they want. If a country’s voters want to launch 
an aggressive war or violate human rights, they cannot do it, 
regardless of their democratic will. I do not deny that the “trustee of 
humanity” proposal is inconsistent with a robust right of democratic 
governance across the board. What I deny is that there is such a 
robust right. The examples of democratic majorities voting to launch 
aggressive war, or to massively violate human rights, show that 
there is no unrestricted and content-neutral human right of 
democratic decision-making: it depends on the decision. 
When Thomas Franck wrote his pioneering article on the 
emerging right of democratic governance in international law, he 
understood it as a right to democratic multi-party elections, 
accompanying the rights to self-determination and free expression.93 
It was emphatically not a right of democratic majorities to violate 
international law. Of course, a state’s failure to accept fiduciary 
responsibilities to humanity that its voters despise is not a self-
standing violation of today’s international law – responsibilities are 
not (yet) legal obligations. I am arguing that they should be – or, less 
alarmingly and more precisely, that they should gradually harden 
from precatory soft-law responsibilities to hard-law obligations, as 
institutions evolve to make them enforceable. The reason, again, is 
that reimagining state sovereignty as trusteeship for humanity is our 
best hope for peace. 
9. Humanity 
R2H raises the philosophical question of what “humanity” 
might be; it’s hard not to recall Carl Schmitt’s warning that whoever 
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invokes humanity wants to cheat.94 Is “humanity” anything beyond 
the aggregate of all human beings?95 The aggregate of all human 
beings is nothing more than a mathematical set of no independent 
normative interest. The set of all human beings has no shared 
language or culture or kinship or bond of common affection. As 
communitarians remind us, communities are thick but “humanity” 
as a mere aggregation is pathetically thin. The set of all humans is 
not a community and is not the famous “family of man.” 
In response, I suggest that we can think of “humanity” as 
something more than the set of all humans. I will borrow a metaphor 
from the colonial model, odious though that may have been. I 
propose we think of humanity as an immature people, a people that 
has not yet recognized itself as such. This is akin to Kant’s view that 
the construction of humanity is a historical process that has a long 
way to go toward its ideal end point of lawful foreign relations and 
just civic orders.96 For Kant, however, our immaturity 
(Unmündigkeit) means our self-imposed inability to think for 
ourselves, so that we turn to others for guidance.97 What I am calling 
our immaturity lies in our self-imposed inability to recognize 
commonality with each other. “Humanity” names the normative 
project of making that recognition real through the practical activity 
of institutionalizing shared responses to shared threats.98 
This emphatically does not mean that at some future point 
we must have a world government reigning over all humanity. As 
philosophers including Kant have well understood, in practice a 
world government would be terrible – a top-heavy imperial 
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monstrosity.  But a people can be a people without a government of 
its own, and that is how we should think about humanity. 
“Humanity” would in any event never be a community 
sharing a distinctive way of life the way that local, thick 
communities do. On the contrary, it would be deeply pluralist, and 
that is a fundamental reason to reject the right-Hegelian proposition 
that a people only attains full self-recognition in its own state.99 
Humanity’s self-recognition of the sort I propose would consist 
solely in recognition that transnational threats require collective 
responses – put in other words, that the standpoint of humanity 
implies the acceptance of transnational responsibilities. The 
responsibility of sovereigns as trustees or fiduciaries, what I have 
called R2H, would be to act on that recognition. 
Other actors, including international organizations, NGOs, 
businesses, and individuals can also adopt the practical stance of 
R2H, so the claim here is not that states are uniquely suited to that 
role. In fact, my argument has been the opposite: threats like the 
democratization of violence undermine the state’s capacity to fulfill 
their protective role, and that is precisely why the concept of 
sovereignty must change. So sovereign fiduciaries will fulfill their 
obligation to humanity by collaborating with private as well as 
public actors, including civil society – assuming those distinctions 
continue to make sense in a world of democratized violence.  
10. The false promise of reactionary nationalism 
The question discussed in section 8 about voter hostility to 
globalism takes us to the contemporary upsurge of nationalism, my 
concluding topic. By now you can guess most of what I have to say: 
that nationalism in its present reactionary form is exactly the wrong 
direction for a realistic politics of peace. 
By “reactionary nationalism” I mean a form of nationalism 
defined by most or all of the following: 
(1) An ethnic definition of the “nation” along the lines of the 
romantic view of the state, regardless of the ethnic mix 
that actually lives there. 
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(2) An exaggerated focus on national pride and dignity, 
often paired with a prickly sense of (real or imagined) 
historical grievance. 
(3) A view of international affairs as overwhelmingly 
competitive and zero-sum, rather than cooperative, 
leading to … 
(4) … a mistrust of internationalism and globalism, often 
coupled with … 
(5) … a suspicion that internationalist projects, including 
international human rights and international criminal 
justice, are the handiwork of self-interested and 
predominantly Western elites, coupled with … 
(6) … a rejection of sovereignty-as-responsibility in favor of 
Westphalian sovereignty-as-control, including …  
(7) … a propensity to denounce all forms of external 
pressure, or even criticism from outsiders (especially 
about human rights), as an affront to sovereignty. 
(8) Illiberalism, receptiveness to big-man personalist rule, 
and concomitant disdain for rule-of-law values. 
(9) Cultural conservatism, especially anti-feminism, under 
the rubric of protecting the nation’s religious and 
historical traditions. 
(10) Xenophobia. 
 Another name for this syndrome might be “populism,” 
which Jan Werner-Müller defines as anti-elitist, anti-pluralist 
movements that claim the right to speak for “the people” and 
demonize those who disagree as enemies.100 I prefer “reactionary 
nationalism” because not all reactionary nationalisms are populist – 
some, notably Chinese nationalism, are top-down –and, of course, 
because I wish to contrast with the internationalism that adherents 
to reactionary nationalism despise and fear. Contemporary 
reactionary nationalism bears a notable resemblance to the deadly 
“tribal nationalism” analyzed by Hannah Arendt in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism. Domestically, tribal nationalism expressed a 
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“perversion of the state into an instrument of the nation and the 
identification of the citizen with the member of the nation”; in 
foreign affairs, “national sovereignty, accordingly, lost its original 
connotation of freedom of the people and was being surrounded by 
a pseudomystical aura of lawless arbitrariness.”101 
Some may protest that my label is unfair to nationalism; 
furthermore, that liberal nationalism is possible and more desirable 
than cosmopolitanism. “Moderate self-preference is the moral core 
of a defensible nationalism,” William Galston writes, and nothing is 
wrong with moderate self-preference.102 But “nationalism” is a 
slippery word that changes its meaning over time, and I think its past 
meanings give it a better reputation than contemporary reactionary 
nationalisms deserve. I have said that early state-making involved 
not only consolidating territories, but forging a “people” – a nation 
to go with the nation-state.103 For nineteenth-century European 
state-makers, nationalism meant overcoming local rivalries in the 
name of unification and economic modernization.104 That required 
dismantling the vestiges of fiefdoms and feudalism, a project that 
harmonized with liberal revolutions and the rule of law. In other 
parts of the world, nationalism means subordinating tribal loyalties 
to larger loyalties. In anti-colonial struggles, nationalism meant 
independence and self-determination. Nationalism understood in 
any of these ways can be thought of us as a progressive ideology, 
especially salutary when we recall the peacekeeping virtues of the 
nation-state.  
 My fear is straightforward: with a few notable exceptions, 
today’s most assertive nationalist parties and movements are 
reactionary, and there is nothing moderate about them. As the 
criteria I listed above indicate, they are illiberal (criterion 8), and not 
at all friendly to the agenda of human rights (criterion 5). In those 
places where reactionary nationalism allies with traditionalist 
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religions, it is also deeply anti-feminist or downright misogynist 
(criterion 9). As for responsibilities beyond borders, reactionary 
nationalists recognize none (criteria 3-6). I am tempted to borrow an 
idea from Imre Lakatos’s philosophy of science, and describe 
nationalism as a degenerating political program, parallel to 
Lakatos’s degenerating research programs – research programs that 
were once promising but are now dead ends.105 Let me try to explain 
why. 
The strongest philosophical arguments on behalf of 
nationalism appeal to communitarian values – civic affection for 
one’s own people in one’s own territory, an idea as old as Aristotle’s 
proposition that friendship lies at the foundation of the polis. But 
contemporary realities don’t align with this communitarian vision of 
nationalism. What we see in today’s reactionary nationalisms is not 
affection for one’s own, but hatred of others – militant anti-
pluralism. With very few exceptions, reactionary nationalist parties 
arise in states with significant minority groups, distinguished from 
the majority by race or religion, that the nationalists wish to exclude 
from the nation as they define it.106 The despised minority may be 
recent immigrants, but they needn’t be. In my own country, for 
example, the most extreme reactionary nationalists define the 
United States as a white, Christian country, notwithstanding that a 
quarter of our population is brown or black, and the black 
population’s ancestors were here from the beginning. This ideology 
has nothing to do with civic solidarity, national history, or 
patriotism. Instead one thinks of Karl Deutsch’s definition of a 
nation: “a group of people united by a mistaken view about the past 
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and a hatred of their neighbors.”107 Today that includes not only 
foreign neighbors, but the different-colored family next door. 
Defining “the nation” to exclude resident minority groups is 
fundamentally anti-communitarian. If I am right that the most 
powerful case for nationalism is a communitarian appeal to the state 
as a political expression of the people, possibly along the lines of 
the romantic view, then much of today’s nationalism is a fraud.  
The characteristic moral virtue associated with nationalism 
is patriotism, and some readers have asked whether I am objecting 
to patriotism. The answer is an energetic no. Patriotism need not be 
xenophobic or reactionary. Indeed, I regard the appropriation of the 
label “patriot” by reactionary nationalists as a sinister propaganda 
ploy, used to demonize liberals and internationalists as unpatriotic – 
a lie that liberal nationalists and ethical cosmopolitans should reject 
and combat.  
We thus find ourselves in a perplexing and deeply frustrating 
situation. At a time when the gravest threats to peace – and to human 
rights – require an internationalist response, politics increasingly 
tilts toward reactionary nationalism.108 Nationalism of this sort 
seems attractive precisely because of the threats and confusion we 
see around us. Yet if I am right, reactionary nationalism is a 
symptom of those ailments, not their cure. The cure is adopting the 
standpoint of humanity, and inventing political and legal institutions 
to make it real. 
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